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Non-tradable Shares Reform, Ownership Structure and Agency Cost
Jun Huang, Feng He,Guowei Zhu
Management School, Hunan University, Changsha, 410082, China
Abstract: This paper examined the non-tradable share reform affects ownership structure and figure out how the mechanism
relationship between two types of equity agency cost changes. In order to achieve the result, data from listed company is
used to analyze the changes of relationship between ownership structure and equity agency cost after non-tradable share
reform. The results of the research show non-tradable share reform has a significant impact on the agency costs; after
non-tradable share reform, the correlation of ownership concentration and Type I agency cost becomes significantly negative,
and the negative relation with Type II agency cost strengthen. On the other hand, the relation between equity restriction and
two types of agency costs shift from non-correlations to significantly positive correlations; negative correlation between
organization investors and agency costs become weaken.

Keywords: structure of equity, non-tradable shares reform, corporate governance, equity agency costs

1

INTRODUCTION
Jensen&Meckling (1976) initially raised the definition of agency problem and agency cost; from then on,

scholars started to conduct extensive research on the affecting factors of agency cost, the methodology of
reducing agency cost; and the measurement of agency cost. The agency cost accrues due to the divergent
objectives between managers and shareholders. No agency cost is existed when managers play the role as the
only shareholder of the company simultaneously, however, when managers start to sell shares, agency behavior
accrues. Managers monopolize the earnings of agency behavior; while agency cost is absorbed by all
shareholders. In order to solve this problem, external shareholders normally sign principal-agent contract with
managers to define the rights and obligations for both parties; however, opportunistic behavior appears due to
the imperfective contract

[1]

. Therefore, the conflicts of profit between shareholders and managers generate

agency cost, known as Type I equity agency cost. In another aspect, the conflicts of profit between major
shareholders and small shareholders generate Type II agency cost, which refers to the increasing cost or less
profit because the controlling shareholders embezzle the profit of small and medium shareholders.
Ownership structure, as the essential of corporate governance, is an important factor for agency cost. In the
early stage of Chinese capital market designing, listed company’s shares are divided into non-tradable and
tradable accordingly. In this specific culture background, the state-owned shares accrue from state-owned
enterprises reformation, are not listed and traded in the capital market currently; others, such as corporate shares,
natural person shares made temporarily arrangement for no circulation; these two situations form the pattern of
non-tradable shares. There are problems due to the equity division, for example, listed companies become the
conflict of profit; not community. The situation which calls “equal share for no equal rights” states that small
and medium investors are suffering serious erosion in profit; simultaneously, the pricing function in capital
market is damaged, the controlling shareholders are easier to undercut the resources

[2]

. Therefore the agency

problem in Chinese listed companies’ is particularly serious.
Based on problems mentioned above, the Chinese government implemented a reform aimed to eliminate
the non-tradable shares through shareholders of non-circulating shares pay for tradable shares to acquire trading
rights. April 29, 2005, the SFC launched "the announcement of concerned problems on the non-tradable shares
reform of listed companies", non-tradable shares reform started. May 9th, four enterprises, Sany, Tsinghua
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Tongfang, ZiJiang enterprise, Jinniu energy, firstly provided the solution for non-tradable shares reform. June
20th, two central authorities organization, Baosteel and Yangtze Power with 42 other enterprises launched the
reform as the second batch. Until the end of Dec 2006, the reform was basically completed. Then, have the
agency costs reduced after the reform of non-tradable shares? Whether the reform lower agency costs by
improving the equity structure?

These issues are necessary to be figured out in the research to improve the

administrative structure and consolidate the achievement of the reform.
2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

2.1 Literature review
Equity structure is an enterprise share distribution structure which composes of different shareholders and
share-holding ratio (Hongjun Zhang, 2000)

[3]

. State-owned share is the single-large shareholders in current

Chinese capital market, the existing researches focus on the impact of agency cost, such as the ownership
concentration, equity restriction, equity property and so on. Li Song, Liangliang Han (2005) figure out agency
cost and ownership concentration has significantly negative correlation, while there is a positive correlation
between agency cost and equity restriction

[4]

. Zuoping Xiao, Desheng Chen (2006) argue that ownership

concentration and agency cost are positively related in a certain extent, alliancing with a few shareholders can
reduce agency cost

[5]

. Lei Gao, Shunlin Song (2007) made a deep study of the state-owned listed company's

agency cost, "one big share alone" and ownership concentration can significantly bring agency costs down, and
yet "commensuration with several shareholders" increases the agency cost

[6]

. Minghui Li (2009) discovers

ownership concentration is helpful to reduce agency cost, and a U-shaped relationship is found between
managerial ownership and equity agency cost [7]. Weide Chun (2009)discovers both of equity concentration and
institutional investors have significantly negative correlation with the agency cost in a consideration of
non-tradable shares reform. Furthermore, agency cost reduces more effectively if the reform was completed
earlier

[8]

. Rong Yang (2009) illustrates that, the level of cash holding in state-owned companies decreased, the

turnover of total assets increased in companies, while the administrative expenses rate had no significant change
after the stock reform [9].
In summary, based on the previous research, Type I agency cost which is generally classified between
shareholders and managers is lacking of the comparative analysis combining with Type II agency cost. At the
same time, studies of reform impacts on agency cost, are mainly to explore the directly influence, but lack of
deep analysis of the impacts on agency cost through ownership structure, and the analysis of approached
positive affects is necessary. This paper systematically examines examine the non-tradable share reform affects
ownership structure and figure out how the mechanism link between two types of equity agency cost changes.
2.2 Research Hypothesis
The non-tradable shares reform solves the circulation problems for non-circulating shares, making profits
for all shareholders be unanimous, equity structure be reasonable, and shareholder’s behavior be rationalized
(Yumin Liu, 2008) [10]. The situation of “one big share alone” is improved and the balance of equity structure is
formed at the same time. The mutual governance structure makes the major shareholders enhance supervision of
effective management to keep profit. As a result, the completion of non-tradable shares’ reform could bring Type
I agency cost down.
As the circulation problem solved, all shareholders have the same profit tend to consider the company
performance; it is beneficial for the supervision and balance of shareholders, and helpful for establishing better
corporate governance structure. This may avoid “tunneling” activities by major shareholders, can reduce Type II
agency cost. These conditions lead to the following proposition 1:
Proposition 1: there is dramatic reduction for two types of agency costs after the listed company finished the
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non-tradable shares reform.
In the situation of small shareholders’ “hitchhiking”; major shareholders have profit motivation to
supervise the managers, which can better solve the agency problem (Shleife&Vishny, 1986) [11]. In theory, the
increasing of ownership concentration can motivate controlling shareholders to supervise the managers to
maximize the profit of the company. However, during the non-tradable share reform period, major shareholders
usually hold non-tradable shares, which result the variance between shareholders’ profit and company's market
value. In this case, Large shareholders only care about the assets’ value and private profits of control, while
"little" contribution on company governance. So it can state that although ownership concentration is high, the
effect on management is extremely small. When the non-tradable share reform directly changed the percentage
of the tradable and non-tradable shares, it indirectly lowered the concentration of ownership; furthermore, based
on the consistency of the shareholders’ profit, the changes of stock prices would encourage large shareholders to
actively participate in the company management and strengthen supervision. As a result, this paper assumes that
ownership concentration has a positive function.
Jensen&Meckling’s (1987) discussed the relationship between controlling shareholder's shares and
"tunneling" behavior earlier. The higher proportion of controlling shareholders, the more suppressed occurrence
of "tunneling" behaviors is (Zengquan Li, 2004)

[12]

. But in the case of non-tradable shares, some scholars

believe that non-tradable shareholders, with their dominant position, are easier to expropriate the profit. As
mentioned above, there is no relationship between equity concentration and Type II agency cost before the
reform. Profit mechanism changed after the reform, and it is not advantage for "tunneling" anymore.
Simultaneously, the equity concentration optimized, we argue that moderate ownership concentration is helpful
to reduce the “tunneling” behaviors. This leads to proposition 2.
Proposition 2: Before the reform, the ownership concentration and the two types of agency costs are not relevant;
after the reform, the ownership concentration proportion is higher, the two types of agency costs are lower.
The equity restriction refers to the mode of mutual supervision by several major shareholders; no
shareholder could individually control the decision of enterprise. The benefits is generating effective supervisory
for the management (Pagano&Roell, 1998) [13], therefore the agency cost is reduced; if the shareholders have no
efficient cooperation instead of laziness or being distracted each other to neglect the management’s supervision,
the agency cost would increase. Before the reform, considering “one big share alone” in state-owned shares,
large shareholders are in charge of the company, and it is very difficult for the equity restriction to play
supervisor role effectively. So it can concern that the equity restriction and Type I agency cost are not related.
After the reform, the equity restriction begins to play an effective role in management. Therefore, we propose its
ratio negatively relates to Type I agency cost.
Other large shareholders’ supervision motivation for controlling shareholder is stronger when the equity
restriction ratio is higher. If the company has several large shareholders, mutual supervision could inhibit a
shareholder transfer company profit to private income (Nagar, Petroni& Wolfenzon, 2000)

[14]

. Before the

reform, the equity restriction ratio is not high due to the “one big share alone”, so it is difficult to positively
supervisor the controlling shareholders’ "tunneling", it is proposed that the equity restriction and Type II agency
cost are not related. With the completion of the non-tradable share reform, the companies improve the equity
restriction ratio, there are a number of large shareholders whom have the ability to restrict and supervise
shareholders’ behaviors for transferring the companies’ assets (Bennedsen&Wolfenzon, 2000)

[15]

. Therefore

after the reform, the equity restriction ratio negatively correlates with Type II agency cost. This theory leads to
the following proposition.
Proposition 3: The equity restriction ratio and two types of agency costs are not relevant before; after the share
reform, the equity restriction ratio is higher; two types of agency costs are lower.
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The advantages such as profession, information and capital by the institutional investors have more
effective supervision for the board of directors and the management in listed companies; supervision cost can be
made by the obtained profit. Therefore, the proportions of institutional shares significantly negatively correlate
with Type I agency cost. After the non-tradable shares reform, with the expansion of institutional investors and
the improvement of related laws and regulations, the institutional investors play an increasingly important role
on corporate governance, so the negative correlation would be enhanced.
Institutional investors, in term of individual investors, possess concentration of capital, professional
management, and portfolio investment’s advantages; they can supervise the large shareholders and alleviate the
invasion of the profits from the small and medium shareholders. Although the controlling shareholders have the
absolute advantages to grasp the tradable shareholders' profits before the reform, it does not affect the
institutional investors’ protecting their own profits. Therefore before the reform, the proportions of institutional
shares are negatively correlated to Types II agency cost. After the reform, along with the implementation of the
full circulation of shares, the proportions of institutional shares increases and institutional investors are more
powerful, so the relationship becomes negative correlation.
Proposition 4: Before the reform, the proportions of institutional shares are higher, two types of agency costs are
lower; after the reform, both of the negative relationships are enhanced.
3

RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1 Sample selection
The initial sample consists of all listed Chinese companies during the period in year 2004 to 2009. In order
to achieve effective result, newly listed companies after 2005, finance and insurance companies, the companies
of S, ST, the loss and the missing data companies are not included. Finally 992 listed companies are selected as
sample companies. The data of the sample companies comes from the CSMAR database, software SPSS17.0 is
used for analyzing.
3.2 Variable Definition
Type I agency cost measure by management expenses ratio. It appears due to the inefficient consumption
and improper investments, so management expenses ratio is suitable. Types II agency cost are losses that the
major shareholders invaded the profits from small shareholders. Since "tunneling" is the main problem, other
receivable could reflect the occupation of funds from large shareholders, that is to say, the number of the amount
"other receivables" divided by the company's total assets at the end of years [16].
Ownership structure is defined by different nature of the shareholders and their ratio. In this paper, three
independent variables including the ownership concentration, the equity restriction, and institutional shares ratio
are selected to reflect the ownership structure. Great changes have taken place in these variables influenced by
the reform of non-tradable shares. The specific variables’ definition illustrate in table 1.
Table 1. Variables’ Definitions
Type
Dependent
Variable

Name

Symbol

Type I Agency Cost

FC

Type II Agency Cost

SC
C1

Independent
Variable
Control
Variable

Ownership Structure

GQ

Financial Leverage

IS
LEV

Corporate Size

SIZE

Definition
Management Expenses/Major business income
The amount of other receivables/the total assets
First shareholder’s shareholding proportion
Total proportion of shareholdings from the second to fifth
holders/proportion of shareholdings of the largest one
The number of funds holdings / the total
Total debt / total assets
the natural logarithm of total assets
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3.3 Formations
Model is constructed to analyze the relationship of ownership structure variables and two types of agency
costs after the reform. The following general model is used.
Model ：AC=α0+α1SRA+α2SIZE+α3LEV+ε1
AC stands for FC and SC, and SAR stands for ownership concentration, equity restriction, and institutional
shares.
4

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

4.1 Descriptive Statistics Analysis
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Analysis
Before the reform

After the reform

Variable
Mean

Median

Std

Mean

Median

Std

FC

0.1198

0.0770

0.1442

0.0817

0.0655

0.0679

SC

0.0554

0.0251

0.0827

0.0273

0.0132

0.0419

C1

0.4231

0.4066

0.1610

0.3625

0.3442

0.1479

GQ

0.5601

0.3818

0.5642

0.5120

0.3275

0.5112

IS

0.0215

0.0004

0.0469

0.0533

0.0091

0.0876

As shown in Table 2, FC and SC reduce 0.0381 and 0.0281 respectively. The mean of ownership
concentration reduces to 0.3625 from 0.4231, median and standard deviation also become smaller, which could
believe that the phenomenon of "one big share alone" is improved; and the equity restriction ratios’ mean
slightly decreased by 0.0481. The proportions of institutional shareholdings significantly increase to 0.0318
after the reform.
4.2 Paired Sample T Test
Based on the time difference on implementing the reform, the agency cost data two years before and after
non-tradable shares’ reform of listed companies are compared. Due to the incompleteness of data in 2010, we
eliminate the data of two listed companies that completed the reform in 2009, and finally receive a total of 990
listed companies in paired samples (as shown in Table 3).
Table 3. Sample Selection
The year of completing the reform

2005

2006

2007

2008

The year of paired

2004-2006

2005-2007

2006-2008

2007-2009

The number of listed companies

181

733

57

19

The total number 990

General point of view in table 4, changes of management expenses rates’ mean are positive before and after
the reform. Type I agency cost after the reform are lower than before, and this difference is significant at 1%
level. In terms of Type II agency cost, the difference is also with 1% level. Results indicate that the reform has
significant influences on agency costs, for remarkable reduction on the two types of agency costs. Therefore, the
results provide strong support for proposition 1.
Table 4. Paired Sample T Test
Mean

Std

t

df

Sig.(2-tailed)

Pair1 A-B

0.0263

0.0932

8.882

989

.000

Pair2 C-D

0.1908

0.0633

9.493

989

.000

Note: A-B stands for paired samples of Type I agency cost; C-D stands for paired samples of Type II agency cost.
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4.3 Multiple Regression Analysis
4.3.1 Relationship Analysis
Sample 1 and sample 2 respectively represent the data of sample companies before and after the reform. As
shown in Table 5, FC has significant negative correlation with C1and IS, while positive correlations with GQ;
SC has the same correlations with them; it is obvious to see that the higher the proportions of first shareholder’s
shareholding and institutional shares and the lower the proportions of the equity restriction are, the lower
management expenses rate and capital occupation of big shareholders, which indicate agency problems are
improved.
Table 5. Relationship Analysis (Sample 1)
FC
.212**
-.089**
.071**
-.123**
-.300**
-.031**

SC
C1
GQ
IS
SIZE
LEV

SC

C1

GQ

IS

SIZE

-.119**
.061**
-.163**
-.167**
.243**

-.764**
.018
.223**
-.112**

-.004
-.199**
.057*

.219**
-.096**

.184**

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

In table 6, the relationships after the reform between the two types of agency costs and ownership structure
variables are the same as before, but the relative strengthen. FC’s negative relation to C1 is enhanced, and the
same as the positive relationship with GQ, but weaken with IS; SG and C1’s negative relationship enhances,
positive relationship with GQ and negative relationship with IS weaken. The results show that the reform has
impacts on ownership structure and agency costs’ relationship.
Table 6. Relationship Analysis (Sample 2)
FC
.235**
-.176**
.096**
-.095**
-.295**
-.190**

SC
C1
GQ
IS
SIZE
LEV

SC

C1

GQ

IS

SIZE

-.184**
.060**
-.138**
-.195**
.085**

-.644**
-.016
.316**
.000

.095**
-.150**
-.039*

.260**
-.005

.277**

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

4.3.2 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis
To investigate the influence of ownership structure and two types of agency costs from the reform, we
intend to analyze the relationship of ownership structure variables and two types of agency costs. As a result of
the higher correlations between every two independent variables, so we make the regression the formation
respectively. Specific results show in Table 7 and 8.
Table 7. Regression Analysis of ownership structure and Type I agency cost
Model 1（C1）

Model 2（GQ）

Model 3（IS）

Variable
Sample 1(FC)

Sample 2(FC)

Sample 1

Sample 2

Sample 1

Sample 2

Constant

1.082(.000)

.430(.000)

1.082(.000)

.445（.000）

1.051(.000)

.450(.000)

SAR

-.020(.387)

-.105(.000)

.009(.677)

.053(.000)

-.057(.011)

-.030(.055)

SIZE

-.299(.000)

-.227(.000)

-.302(.000)

-.255(.000)

-.290(.000)

-.254(.000)

LEV

.022(.339)

-.127(.000)

.024(.287)

-.117(.000)

.017(.459)

-.119(.000)

Table 8 Regression Analysis of ownership structure and Type II agency cost
Variable

Model 4(C1)

Model 5(GQ)

Model 6(IS)

Sample 1

Sample 2

Sample 1

Sample 2

Sample 1

Sample 2

Constant

.391(.000)

.186(.000)

.399(.000)

.202(.000)

.363(.000)

.191(.000)

SAR

-.042(.063)

-.122(.000)

.001(.953)

.031(.044)

-.094(.000)

-.082(.000)

SIZE

-.204(.000)

-.195(.000)

-.219(.000)

-.232(.000)

-.196(.000)

-.213(.000)

LEV

.277(.000)

.139(.000)

.283(.000)

.150(.000)

.270(.000)

.144(.000)
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(1) Ownership Concentration and Agency Costs. Shows in the model 1 of table 7, C1 and FC are not
significant correlate in sample 1. In sample 2, C1 and FC’s negative correlation strengthens in 1% level. In
Model 5, the results of regression suggest that C1 and SC’s negative correlation is not remarkable in sample 1,
but becomes significant in sample 2. Therefore, proposition 2 is proved, which provides the fact that the reform
produces positive effect on optimizing the correlation of the ownership concentration and two types of agency
costs.
(2)Equity Restriction and Agency Costs. In model 2 of Table 7, GQ and FC in the former case are without
correlation, while a remarkable positive correlation appears after the reform. With the phenomenon of “one
large share alone”, the proportion of equity restriction is too low to play a role. Although all of shares could be
tradable in the market nowadays, the result is not ideal. One reason could be weakness in the management
supervision; on the other hand, due to "hitchhiking" existence, each large shareholder hopes other large
shareholders effectively supervise the operators. The regression of model 6 shows, GQ and SG is not significant
related in sample 1; but there is positive correlation at 5% level in sample 2. After the reform of non-tradable
shares, the equity restriction as a governance factor enter the listed company management category. This is more
than "restriction" between shareholders; when the "collusion" income is higher than the "restriction", they may
choose "collusion", which leads to the increase of agency costs.
(3) Institutional Investors and Agency Costs. IS and FC have a strong negative correlation, the regression
coefficient increased slightly after the reform, appears the enhancement in the relationship in model 4 of table 7.
The same results between IS and SC in model 8 of table 8 which provide strong supports for proposition 5.
5

CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines how the non-tradable share reform affects ownership structure and the mechanism of

equity agency cost in depth and using the listed companies from 2004-2009 in China as the research sample data,
to make empirical analysis on how reform as one major event influence the agency costs. It is resulted that the
non-tradable shares’ reform has a significant influence on the two types of agency costs, and optimizes the
relationship between the ownership concentration, the institutional shares and the two types of agency costs.
While the equity restriction do not play an active role in reducing the two types of agency costs. The completion
of non-tradable shares reform provides a good environment to improve China's ownership structure of listed
companies, and the reasonable ownership structure is the most important issue for improving the agency
problems. Some other suggestions can be concluded as follows:
Limitation to change Chinese listed companies’ “one large share alone” state is not desirable. Because of
non-tradable share reform, highly concentrated ownership structure can effectively reduce the profit conflicts of
the management and shareholders and the “tunneling” behaviors of large shareholders. The proportion of “one
large share alone” decreasing may weaken the large shareholders’ motivation of monitoring the management;
and although the equity restriction has arisen, the competition among these shareholders may overweigh the
supervision. It is indispensable that ownership concentration has a moderately decreasing coordinates with a
good partnership among large shareholders. Good cooperation could be formed from improving two aspects of
the legal system and the articles of the company, which create a good operating environment for the equity
restriction functioning properly.
Increasing the proportion of institutional shares and encouraging minority shareholders to actively
participate in the company governance is an effective way to reduce the equity agency costs. Institutional
investors own professional advantages can alleviate the equity agency costs by the effective participation in
company operation and management. After the non-tradable reform, our task is to reasonably and effectively
introduce the diversity and the scale of investment and reduce the speculation, conducting the institutional
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investors to join in the process of corporate governance.
Consolidation and improvement of the late outcome of non-tradable shares’ reform are necessary. The
completion of the reform relieves profits’ conflicts of the large and minority shareholders and weakens
motivations of “tunneling” and the improper consume of the managers. However, equity restriction’s positive
effects on agency cost are not obvious. In the era of the non-tradable reform, it is required to improve the level
of corporate governance and relevant legal system, restricting larger shareholders’ collusion behaviors and
encouraging minority shareholders to participate in corporate governance, which make the share-trading reform
effect fully functional.
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